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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs. 
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 920309-CA 
Priority Classification 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 78-2a-3(2) (f), Utah Code Annotated, as amended confers 
jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to decide the appeal in 
this case as this appeal is from a court of record, Davis County 
District Court, involving a criminal case, a third degree felony. 
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STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a criminal case appealing a final Judgment of 
conviction and sentence of a third degree felony, Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, to wit: cocaine, from the District Court of 
Davis County, Utah, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether or not the evidence seized from the warrantless 
search of the defendant is admissible? 
2. Whether or not Trooper Maycock's detention of the 
defendant exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop and was 
not justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity? 
3. Whether or not seizure of cocaine from defendant and his 
motor vehicle was obtained by wrongful exploitcition and therefore 
not admissible? 
4. Whether or not Trooper Maycock had probable cause to 
search defendant's motor vehicle? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The standard of review is the same for all issues presented by 
this appeal. In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not be disturbed 
-2-
unless they ire clearly errone* State v. Steward, 806 P 2d 
i n revi ewi ng the trial 
coui r -5 corn., ..asion.- - . .appellate cour t appl i es a 
correction or error standard. -VJLZJL. BOS P. 2d at 23 5. 
PETERMINATIVE CONGTTTUT' 101IA1 • IROVTSiOHT , 
STATTTTES | ORD1 NAN^ER , AMn Hr.JIjKf.5 
1. r\rtic:|p | ( section II nil I Inn M a t e nl lit.ill i..:onsl. l l.ut i on 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
o. Section 4 1 -r 14.20(2) Utah Code- Annotated, as amended 
4. Section 77 •" r .16 [TI ail Jode Annotated, as amended 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
!• Nature of , the case, ' i i i in I in,i I casu i nvn I  \n tiqi an 
ippea, rrom a final judgment of conviction and sentence ot a third 
i?-?vc'a felony, Possession of <i Controlled Substance, tu wit. 
- :<- the Di s ti: :i ::  I:: Cc i n: t: ::: f Da \ i s C zii i i :t t::] ;
 j| u tah . 
Course of proceedings. The state of Utah filed on 
October I I MM I HI I nf ormaf i on chargi ng defendant II ef trey M 
Roche IJ with I 'i Jssessxoii ol a Controlled Substance w ith Intent to 
Distribute, a second degree felony; Unlawful Possession of Cocaine 
*M th< ml lav M riiiiniii i1 »H t ixiall I lliiiii i ill i l eq re i ' t e ln iny ; .mil peed i mj i 
c J ass C misdemeanor, all alieged to have occurred on June ") , 199 1. 
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in Davis County, Utah. 
On February 24, 1992 defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, 
together with accompanying Memorandum of Law, seeking to suppress 
both baggies of cocaine seized by a state trooper. One baggie was 
seized from Defendant's person and the second baggie was taken from 
his motor vehicle. 
A suppression hearing was held on March 18, 1992 before 
District Judge Douglas L. Cornaby. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
David V. Maycock was called as a witness by the plaintiff, State of 
Utah. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made its 
findings of fact and concluded the trooper could search defendant 
prior to searching his vehicle. The trial court found it was 
reasonable that all evidence could be received into evidence and 
denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were later filed on June* 12, 1992. 
On April 14, 1992 defendant petitioned the* trial court for a 
review of the trial court's decision arising out of the suppression 
hearing based on State v. Loveqren. 183 Utah Adv. Rep 81, (Utah 
App. 1992) published April 7, 1992. The trial court after 
reviewing Loveqren denied defendant's motion to reverse its ruling 
and refused to suppress the evidence pursuant to a written ruling 
filed April 15, 1992. 
On April 15, 1992 Defendant Rochell entered a conditional 
guilty plea to Possession of a Controlled Substance, Cocaine, a 
third degree felony before District Judge Douglas L. Cornaby. 
On May 12, 1992 Defendant Rochell was sentenced by District 
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J u d g e Doug "Lao . Cornaby t o t h e Ut.ih S t * ~ * i 
grante«.J a 3z~a ^i Lsxecul.oi j , u a o e a ^n ^.ruoat .:, ^i .^, -ne c o n d i t i o n 
«-• s e r v e t h i r t y <; JO) d a y s .1.. )a\. : s Cou; * y J a i l . * i led 5 ^ ) 
- j ' * • • : 'v - 3 . . : : , . * * ! - i 
ordinary conditions required by the Department ->r Adu 1 Frouatn. 1 
and Parole. judgment of the trial court was entered on June 2, 
1/99 2, 
Dn May 1 4, 1992 defendant fil ed a Notice of Appeal with the 
Davis County Clerk's office appea 3 :1 ng to the Utah Court of Appeals 
of a Controlled Substance Contemporaneous with filing the Notice 
of Appeal Defendant f:i ] ed am Applicati on for Certi f i cate of 
Probable Cause and Cex til, ficate of I: >robab3 e Cause.. The Cei tificate 
of Probable Cause was signed by District Judge Dougl as L. Cornaby 
Defendant's appea] 
On June 4j( 3 992 Defendant filed an Amended Notire of Appeal to 
proper 1} per f" a ct hiu appeal J^ JludqiiienL yyj.i uiil.1.1 mi un Jum < , ! JO,! 
with the Davi s County Clerk's office. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court, On March 18, 199i!r District 
3 "i idge Douglas L, Cornaby denied defendant .1 Motion to Suppress. On 
April 15, 3 90! the tnaJ court denied defendant's motion to review 
its pri or ruling base il rn State v, Lovegren, IS 1 lll-.ih il\ lep I Ml. 
(Utah App. 1992) published n 1 April ' 199,!, mi April 10, 1992 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea Lo Llic cliaiye of 
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Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony. On 
May 12, 1992 Defendant was sentenced by District Judge Douglas L. 
Cornaby. On May 14, 1992 Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal and on 
June 4, 1992 filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts. On June 5, 1991 Defendant 
Rochell was observed by Trooper David V. Maycock driving a Mustang 
motor vehicle northbound on 1-15 near the St. Joseph's area in 
North Salt Lake City (Tr. p.3). Trooper Maycock's visual 
observation indicated Defendant was travelling at 65 miles per hour 
(Tr. p.3). His.visual observation was confirmed by radar which he 
locked in at 65 miles per hour (Tr. p.3). Defendant was traveling 
10 miles per hour over the posted speed limited of 55 mph (Tr. 
p.6). 
The offense took place at 8:15 p.m., it was a clear day and 
the sun was up (Tr. p.11). The driver, Jeffrey W. Rochell, acted 
in an appropriate manner when pulled over by Trooper Maycock (Tr. 
p.12). He did not attempt to elude, evade or otherwise flee (Tr. 
p. 12). 
The Defendant upon stopping exited his vehicle and walked back 
toward the Trooper's vehicle (Tr. p.12). Defendant Rochell and 
Trooper Maycock met at a point between their vehicles (Tr. p.4). 
The Defendant did not appear angry, argumentative, or nervous (Tr. 
p.13). Defendant upon request produced a valid driver's license 
(Tr. p.13). 
Trooper Maycock, standing approximately arm's length from 
defendant, detected the odor of alcohol about Defendant. (Tr. p. 13, 
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Trooper Maycoek requested Defendant- to perform, the horizontal 
gaze -v <raa^ '* : - L* * l> I I) Trooper Maycoek 
josei veo < .ucs .- . .dow*; J. \..L<. .est that Defendant was 
intoxicated - . A:- . r-s.^ ul* . T'rooper Maycoek did not cite 
•* r * \ - - I I'm 11 in 
Jurmg t~.,e rield sobriet - t«--st, Trooper Mdvcock stood at least 
an arm's 1 ength dista nee from. Defendant :i n order to' track the 
iTio ve oiei in I i if Il )ef enc'Iai mi •*" i i s y e . s mi I I|" i | i I ' '" i I 1 m i i i 1 iq I lie- e i i l i ro. 
encounter with Defendant no suspacioiis or dangerous movements were 
imiftdt'-! toward \\v (Observed bv Trooper Maycoek (Tr. p. 16) . Trooper 
lwl*jy<: LICI- i inn ill mi ill in I i I.) 1 Illy I . U I I M unt. i n q Del e n d a n l , m i l i I 
the field sobriety testr did not frisk Defendant Rocheli as he f e I -; 
no need to do so (Tr, p. 16). 
Trooper Maycoek asked Defendant to produce the registiation 
for his vehicle (Tr. p. 16). The registration was .. *ne vehicle's 
• ij'J o v *=• b o x ("T'"i" . p 1 • ) Illii'pfpind.n i I:: w a ] ked fr om thei : i 1 1 1 In i •-; 
vehicle and reached into the glo v e box (Tr • p.l 3 ). Trooper Maycoek 
d :i d not search the glove box: or veh icle prior to allowing Defendant: 
I in i" (".'aclh, in t . i 1. Il lie "flui n>> box ( !""i |i Il ) , Tli '• Del. e i id t in i maile n > 
gestures that he might be reaching for a weapon (Tr. p. I I, IH ) , 
Defendant produced a va] id regi stration to h i s vehicle (Tr p. 1H) 
and registration and that there were no outstanding warrants for 
Defendant through his dispatcher (Tr. p. 20 , 2:11 ) . 
When Defendant Rocheli opened the passenger door to obtain his 
registration a blue cup containing an alcoholic beverage fell onto 
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the ground (Tr. p.19). The passenger in the vehicle identified 
himself as Billy G. Miller, but had no identification on him (Tr. 
p.5). While confronting the passenger, Trooper Maycock looked 
inside the vehicle but did not observe any objects of concern to 
him (Tr. p.19). No second open container of alcohol was observed 
by Trooper Maycock (Tr. p.20). 
Trooper Maycock asked Defendant if he understood Utah's open 
container law and received an affirmative reply (Tr. p.20). 
Defendant was asked to return to his vehicle, and Trooper Maycock 
took with him Defendant's driver's license and registration to his 
patrol car (Tr. p. 20). Trooper Maycock wrote two citations, one to 
Defendant for speeding 65 mph in a 55 mph zone and no seat belt and 
the other citation to co-defendant Billy G. Miller for open 
container (Tr. p.21, 22). During this period of time, Defendant 
was detained and not free to leave (Tr. p.21). Approximately 15 
minutes had elapsed to this point in time from when Defendant was 
stopped. (Tr. p.22). 
After citing the Defendant and passenger, Trooper Maycock 
intended to search them and the vehicle (Tr. p.23, 24). After 
completing the citations Trooper Maycock approached Defendant's 
vehicle a second time (Tr. p.22). Trooper Maycock asked them both 
to step out of their vehicle and join him at the front of their 
vehicle (Tr. p.22). 
Neither party had done anything to indicate to Trooper Maycock 
they were armed and dangerous (Tr. p.22). Trooper Maycock had 
formed the intent to search the driver's immediate area in the 
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vehicle for another open container (Tr. p.23). Trooper Maycock was 
not searching the vehicle for weapons or drugs (Tr. p.23, 24). 
At the time Trooper Maycock asked Defendant Rochell and Billy 
G. Miller to join him at the front of their vehicle he had formed 
the intent to search their person (Tr. p.24). Nothing had alerted 
him to the fact that either may be armed and dangerous (Tr. p.24). 
Trooper Maycock asked them if they had any weapons on them. Both 
responded they did not (Tr. p.27). Billy G. Miller voluntarily 
opened his pockets and offered everything in his pockets and turned 
around to show Trooper Maycock his beltline to reveal no weapons 
(Tr. p.7). 
Trooper Maycock directed his attention to Defendant (Tr. p.7). 
He noticed a bulge in Defendant's left front pocket of his shorts, 
a fairly large bulge (Tr. p.8). Trooper Maycock could not tell 
what the bulge was but it appeared to be 3 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 
inches to 2 inches and 1 to 1 1/2 inches thick (Tr. p. 31, 34). 
Trooper Maycock could not tell what the object was only that it was 
hard after tapping it with his fingers (Tr. p.32, 8). Defendant 
put his hand in his front left pocket and pulled out a set of keys 
(Tr. p.8). Trooper Maycock observed there was still something in 
Defendant's pocket and tapped it again (Tr. p.8). Trooper Maycock 
asked the Defendant "What is that?" (Tr. p.32). Defendant reached 
into his pocket a second time and pulled out some change and in the 
course of doing that partially exposed a plastic baggie (Tr. p.32, 
9). Trooper Maycock asked him "What's that baggie?" (Tr. p.9). 
Defendant put his hand back into his pocket, rustled around again, 
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pulled his hand out of his pocket and put it behind his back (Tr. 
p.9). At that time, Officer Garrido, North Salt Lake Police, 
approaching defendant from the rear, reached out and grabbed the 
baggy containing a white powdery substance (Tr. p.9, 10). Officer 
Garrido had radioed Trooper Maycock, while Trooper Maycock was 
writing out the citations in his patrol car, to determine his 
location in order to return Trooper Maycock's hcindcuffs (Tr. p.6). 
Defendant Rochell was arrested by Trooper Maycock after 
Officer Garrido took the baggie from him (Tr. p. 10). After 
mirandizing Defendant inquiry was made if there was any other dope 
in the vehicle (Tr. p.10). Trooper Maycock found a second baggie 
between the cushions of the passenger seat where the riser meets 
the runner (Tr. p.33). Trooper Maycock admitted discovery of the 
first baggie from Defendant led to discovery of the second baggie 
in the vehicle (Tr. p. 32). 
When asked why Trooper Maycock simply did not request Officer 
Garrido to watch Defendant and his passenger while he searched the 
vehicle Trooper Maycock responded he did not want any assisting 
officer to be hurt (Tr. p.29). 
Trooper Maycock also admitted he could have cited Defendant 
Rochell for open container in addition to speeding and no seat belt 
as Defendant allowed a passenger to have an opem container in his 
vehicle (Tr. p.30). Trooper Maycock responded that legally he 
could have issued Defendant a citation for an open container but 
morally he did not feel it was correct unless Defendant Rochell 
actually had an open container (Tr. p.30, 31). 
-10-
No second open container was located after search of 
defendant's motor vehicle by Trooper Maycock and Officer Garrido 
(Tr. p.25). 
Trooper Maycock testified his probable cause to search 
defendant's vehicle for a second open container was that he 
detected the driver and passenger to both have an odor of alcohol 
on their breath but he had only observed one open container of 
alcohol in the vehicle; i.e, the blue cup that fell to the ground 
(Tr. p.24, 25). 
The trial court estimated approximately 15 to 25 minutes had 
elapsed from the time Defendant's vehicle was stopped until 
defendant was searched (Tr. p.46). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A peace officer may frisk a person for dangerous weapons if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger. This is 
a narrowly drawn exception to the constitutional protection that 
all warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. A peace officer 
may pat down an individual to neutralize the threat of harm when he 
possesses specific, articulable facts that such person may be armed 
and dangerous. Anything beyond such a brief intrusion to check for 
weapons constitutes a de facto arrest and probable cause to search 
is required. 
Trooper Maycock did not initially frisk Defendant evidencing 
no fear or suspicion Defendant was armed and dangerous. After the 
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citation was prepared, and 15 to 25 minutes had elapsed, Trooper 
Maycock ordered defendant from his vehicle to search him prior to 
searching his vehicle for a open container of alcohol. Neither 
Defendant nor his passenger had done anything to indicate to 
Trooper Maycock they were armed or dangerous prior to his search of 
Defendant (Tr. p.22). Therefore, the frisk of Defendant Rochell 
prior to searching the vehicle was not for dangerous weapons based 
upon a reasonable belief or suspicion and therefore not permitted 
by Terry v. Ohio or section 77-7-16 U.C.A., as amended. Secondly, 
Trooper Maycock's detention of Defendant Rochell after preparing 
the traffic citations exceeded the scope of the initial traffic 
stop and was not further justified by a reasonable suspicion of 
serious criminal activity. A peace officer's stop of a motor 
vehicle is a seizure subject to constitutional protection. A 
traffic stop is a limited seizure and is more like an investigative 
detention than a custodial arrest. The issue of whether the 
investigative detention was reasonable, as governed by Terry v. 
Ohio, involves two tests: 
(1) Was Trooper Maycock's action justifi€id initially?, and 
(2) Was Trooper Maycock's action reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified his initial stop? 
Trooper Maycock properly stopped Defendant Rochell for 
speeding 65 mph in a 55 mph zone. However, observation of one open 
container with both occupants of the vehicle with alcohol on their 
breath does not justify nor give Trooper Maycock reasonable 
articulable suspicion of serious criminal activity beyond the 
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initial traffic offense justifying further detention of defendant 
and his later arrest. 
Third, seizure of the controlled substance from Defendant's 
motor vehicle was obtained by illegal exploitation and therefore 
not lawfully seized. Defendant Rochell's admission and disclosure 
of a second baggie of cocaine in • his vehicle was unlawfully 
obtained following Trooper Maycock's illegal seizure of cocaine 
from Defendant. The State of Utah must show Defendant's consent to 
search his vehicle was (1) voluntary and (2) not obtained by 
exploitation of the prior illegality. Evidence obtained in 
searches following police illegality must meet both tests to be 
admissible. Defendant's consent to search was sufficiently tainted 
from the illegal seizure of the controlled substance from his 
pocket. The consent occurred during an ongoing illegal seizure, 
thus no time factor nor other intervening factors separated the 
illegality from the consent. Defendant's consent to search was 
the result of the exploitation of his illegal detention and illegal 
search of his person. 
Finally, Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable 
suspicion or probable cause to search Defendant or his motor 
vehicle. Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable 
suspicion of serious criminal activity or probable cause justifying 
further detention of Defendant after preparation of the citations 
for speeding, no seat belt and open container. The fact that 
Defendant may have been hesitant in his responses to Trooper 
Maycock's questioning when standing in front of his vehicle does 
-13-
not support a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity or 
probable cause. Nor does the fact that the Trooper discovered only 
one open container of alcohol. The Trooper's hunch, without more, 
does not raise a reasonable articulable suspicion. The fact that 
both occupants had alcohol on their breath does not indicate there 
is other alcohol in the vehicle. Trooper Maycock could have cited 
Defendant Rochell for an open container violation but chose to 
search his vehicle for other evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE; THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT ROCHELL 
WAS UNLAWFUL AS THERE EXISTED NO REASONABLE 
BASIS TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT WAS ARMED AND 
PRESENTLY DANGEROUS WHEN HE WAS FRISKED 
A peace officer, pursuant to section 77-7-16, U.C.A., as 
amended may frisk a person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably 
believes he or any other person is in danger. State v. Roybol, 716 
P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986). The Utah statute is subject to and 
interpreted in light of the constitutional requirements of Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In 
Terry, the Supreme Court established a narrowly drawn exception to 
the requirement that police obtain a warrant for all searches. 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, subject to only a few specifically established 
exceptions. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed. 2d 
576 (1967). 
One exception to the warrant requirement permits an officer to 
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pat down a person for weapons when he reasonably suspects that such 
person may be armed and dangerous based upon specific and 
articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. The 
standard is whether a reasonably prudent man under the 
circumstances would believe that his safety or that of others was 
in jeopardy. State v. Roybol, supra. A brief check for weapons is 
permissible but anything beyond such a brief and narrowly defined 
intrusion constitutes a de facto arrest, and probable cause is 
required. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2254 
(1979). 
Trooper Maycock did not initially frisk Defendant Rochell upon 
confronting him and during the time of the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus as he felt no need to do so (Tr. p. 16). This fact 
strongly suggests that once Defendant exited his vehicle and stood 
within arm's length of Trooper Maycock the trooper did not suspect 
he was armed and dangerous. Prior to the actual frisk and search 
of Defendant, some 15 to 25 minutes after the initial stop, neither 
Defendant nor his passenger had done anything to suggest they were 
armed and dangerous (Tr. p.22). Therefore, the frisk and pat down 
of Defendant Rochell prior to searching his vehicle was not for 
dangerous weapons based upon a reasonable belief or suspicion 
permitted by Terry v. Ohio, supra or section 77-7-16 U.C.A., as 
amended. 
POINT TWO: TROOPER MAYCOCK7S DETENTION OF DEFENDANT 
ROCHELL EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 
AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
-15-
A police officer's stop of a vehicle is a seizure subject to 
fourth amendment protections. De1aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 
215 (Utah App. 1991). A traffic stop is a limited seizure and is 
more like an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. 
United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Civ. 1991). In 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit all seizures, but only unreasonable ones. To 
determine if a seizure is reasonable two questions must be asked: 
(1) Was Trooper Maycock's action initially justified?, and (2) 
Was Trooper Maycock's action reasonably relate.d in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place? 
State v. Robinson. 797 P. 2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990); State v. 
Parker, 189 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Utah App. 1992). 
Clearly, Trooper Maycock was justified in stopping Defendant 
for speeding 65 mph in a 55 mph zone (Tr. p. 3). It was not a 
pretext stop (Tr. p.4 3). However, Trooper Maycock's conduct and 
subsequent action must also be reasonably related in length and 
scope to the stop of Defendant's motor vehicle for the initial 
traffic violations. State v. Loveqren, 183 Utah Adv. Rep 81 (Utah 
App. 1992). The Supreme Court has ruled that the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. 
Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983). Once the reasons for the initial stop of 
the vehicle have been completed, the occupants must be allowed to 
proceed on their way. State v. Loveqren. supra. Any further 
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temporary detention for investigative questioning after the 
fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop is 
justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining police 
officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. 
State v* Robinson, supra. Whether reasonable suspicion exists 
depends upon the totality of the circumstances. State v. Steward, 
supra? State v. Lovecrren, supra. 
Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable suspicion 
of criminal activity beyond the initial traffic offense justifying 
further detention of Defendant. Defendant gave no reason to be 
searched by reason of his peaceful, cooperative attitude and 
Trooper Maycock was admittedly not fearful that Defendant was armed 
and dangerous (Tr. p.22). Trooper Maycock had no reason to search 
Defendant or his passenger. 
Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable suspicion 
there would be an open container of alcohol in Defendant's vehicle. 
According to Trooper Maycock it is perhaps logical and reasonable 
to assume Defendant had consumed alcohol other than in his vehicle 
(Tr. p.25). Trooper Maycock had no basis to assume that there 
existed an open container of alcohol within Defendant's immediate 
reach when he was seated in his vehicle. Upon actual search no 
open container was discovered (Tr. p.25). Trooper Maycock did not 
observe any objects which appeared to be open containers of alcohol 
when he looked inside the vehicle (Tr. p.19). 
POINT THREE: SEIZURE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FROM 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL 
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EXPLOITATION AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE 
Defendant Rochell admitted and disclosed to Trooper Maycock 
the location of a second baggie of cocaine in his vehicle following 
the search and seizure of cocaine from his pocket (Tr. p.10). 
Trooper Maycock admitted discovering the first baggie from the 
person of Defendant led to producing the second one (Tr. p.32). 
The burden of proof is upon the State of Utah to show that the 
consent was voluntary and not obtained by exploitation of the prior 
illegality. State v. Arroyo, supra. The issue is whether 
Defendant's consent was sufficiently tainted by the illegal seizure 
of the controlled substance from his front pocket. The factors to 
be considered in an exploitation analysis are temporal proximity of 
the illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S. Ct. 
2254, 2261-2262 (1975). 
The second baggie was discovered as a result of exploitation 
of the illegal detention and search of Defendant's person and not 
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 
407, 417 (1963). The State of Utah has the burden to prove the 
existence of intervening factors which prove that Defendant's 
consent was sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegality. 
State v. Arroyo, supra. 
No such intervening factors exist in this case. Defendant's 
consent was obtained during an ongoing illegal search and there is 
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no delay in time between the illegal search and the consent. Nor 
has the State shown any intervening circumstances separating the 
illegality from the consent. Defendant's consent to search was the 
result of the exploitation of his illegal detention and unlawful 
search of his person. State v. Godina-Luna, 179 Utah Adv. Rep 21 
(Utah App. 1992); State v. Harqraves, 806 P. 2d 228 (Utah App. 
1991). 
POINT FOUR: TROOPER MAYCOCK DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
DETAIN DEFENDANT AND SEARCH DEFENDANT OR HIS 
MOTOR VEHICLE 
Trooper Maycock admitted he had formed the intent to search 
Defendant's vehicle for an open container and to personally frisk 
Defendant and his passenger as he was approaching Defendant's 
vehicle to give them their citations (Tr. p.23, 27). Therefore, 
the fact that Defendant may be hesitant in responding to Trooper 
Maycock's questioning and his failure to voluntarily empty his 
pockets when standing in front of his vehicle did not provide 
reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity nor probable 
cause to search Defendant or his vehicle. Nervous behavior when 
confronted by a police officer does not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Godina-Luna, supra. 
The fact that both parties had been drinking and the Trooper 
only saw one open container does not support a reasonable suspicion 
of serious criminal activity justifying further detention of 
defendant and search of Defendant or his vehicle. In Lovecrren, the 
Court of Appeals held the fact that a car was cluttered with pop 
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cans, beer cans, cigarette packages and ashes does not indicate 
Defendants were involved in criminal activity. Lovegren at 83. 
Trooper Maycock's "hunch" that there may be another open container 
in the vehicle, without more, is not sufficient to raise a 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. Trooper Maycock already had lawful 
authority to cite Defendant Rochelle for an open container but 
chose not to do so (Tr. p. 30, 31). There existed no reason to 
search Defendant and his vehicle other than the personal desire of 
Trooper Maycock. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Rochell petitions this Court to reverse the trial 
court and suppress all evidence seized from Defendant's person and 
his vehicle, and remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent therewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ic? day of August, 1992. 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this j/V ~~~~ day of August, 1992, I 
mailed four copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, Attorney for State of Utah, 
Appellee, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
10BERT L T N E S L E Y 
Attorney for Defendant 
Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL.DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
/ 
JEFFREY WARREN ROCHELL, : Case No, 921700013 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on for hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress on the 18th day of March, 1992• Defendant was present and 
represented by Robert Neeley, the State was represented by William 
K. McGuire. The Court, having heard evidence and considered the 
memoranda of the parties, hereby enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Defendant was stopped for speeding 65 miles per hour 
in a 55 mile per hour zone. 
2. Officer David Maycock noticed smell of alcohol on 
defendant's breath. 
3. Upon securing the registration, an open container 
fell from the passenger side of the vehicle. The officer 
determined it contained alcohol. 
4. The passenger in the vehicle had also been consuming 
an alcoholic beverage. 
5. The officer proceeded to write out citations; 
speeding and no seat belt to defendant and open container to the 
passenger. He then determined to search the vehicle for additional 
open containers since both occupants had been drinking, but only 
one container had been seen at that time. 
6- The officer asked each occupant whether they had any 
weapons. The passenger, Mr. Miller, said no, emptied his pockets 
and turned around to show that he had no weapons. The defendant 
was hesitant in answering no and did not offer the contents of his 
pocket. 
7. The officer noticed a bulge in defendant's left front 
pocket measuring 3-1/2 inches in diameter and 1 to 1-1/2 inches 
deep. The officer believed it could have been a knife or other 
weapon• 
8. After the officer asked what the bulge was, defendant 
reached into his pocket and pulled out keys. However, the bulge 
was still present and the officer found it was still hard. The 
defendant then reached in and pulled out coins and as he did so a 
portion of a plastic baggie was exposed. 
9. The officer asked what it was and the defendant said 
"nothing" and pulled his hand out of the pocket and placed it 
behind his back. 
10. A second officer, approaching from the rear, 
observed a baggie of white powder and seized it. 
11. Following the seizure of the baggie, defendant told 
the officer that another baggie was in the car and it was seized. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was a proper 
traffic stop and not a pretext stop. 
2. The officer had probable cause to believe that 
another alcoholic beverage was in the vehicle and therefore a 
search of the vehicle for that purpose was appropriate. 
3. It was reasonable for the officer to determine if 
either of the occupants were armed with weapons prior to commencing 
a search of the vehicle. Based upon what he observed, the officer 
had a right to conduct a pat down of both occupants, 
4. The seizure of the plastic baggie from defendant's 
hand was permissible. 
5. The seizure of the baggie from the vehicle was 
pursuant to a valid arrest and appropriate impound of the vehicle. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby ORDERS that defendant's motion 
to suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this
 /qz- day of f.Z\.^ , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct unexecuted 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with 
postage prepaid thereon, to Robert Neeley, Attorney for Defendant 
at 2495 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 3rd day 
of June, 1992. 
Secretary/ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO REVIEW RULING 
Criminal No. 921700013 
The defendant, Jeffrey W. Rochell, has asked for a review of 
the ruling of the Court arising out of the suppression hearing. 
The review is based on State v. Lovearen, 18 3 Utah Adv Rep. 81 
(April 7, 1992). 
The Court has reviewed that case. It finds the facts to be 
distinguishable. The Highway patrolman, Trooper Haycock, asked 
for the vehicle registration. Mr. Rochell opened the passenger 
door of the vehicle to obtain it. A blue plastic cup containing 
an alcoholic beverage fell out. It is illegal to have an open 
container of an alcoholic beverage in a vehicle. This case then 
became more than a routine traffic stop and the Trooper was 
justified in searching the vehicle around the seats to see if 
there were other alcoholic beverages. He was also justified in 
searching the vehicle occupants, including the defendant, to see 
that they were not carrying weapons. 
The motion to review the ruling is denied. The Court 
refuses to suppress the evidence. 
Dated April 14, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to William McGuire, Davis 
County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah 84025 and Robert L.. 
Neeley, 2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401 on 
April /5^7 1992. 
\axzLu 4^a^Hn 
Clerk <] 
MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL- DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
JEFFREY WARREN ROCHELL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No,. 92170 0013 
Hon, Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge 
The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the 
12th day of May, 1992, the defendant being present in person and 
represented by his attorney, Robert Neeley, the State being 
represented by Carvel R. Harward, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, 
Judge, presiding. 
The defendant having been convicted upon a plea of guilty 
of the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony of 
the third degree, and the Court having asked if the defendant had 
anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no 
sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the 
Court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the 
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony of the 
third degree, as charged and convicted. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confiri^± and 
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imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 
0-5 years, and is fined $2,000 as provided by law, 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is granted a 
stay of execution of the above sentence and the defendant is placed 
on probation under the supervision of the Utah State Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole for a period of three years under the 
following conditions: 
1. Usual and ordinary conditions required by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole to be set forth in an 
agreement. 
2. Thirty days in the Davis County Jail with work 
release. 
3. All but $550 of the fine is suspended on satisfactory 
completion of probation. Fine of $550 and surcharge of $467.50 is 
to be paid through the clerk of the court at a rate of $100 per 
month on or before the first Tuesday of each month beginning with 
July, 1992. The defendant is to be present on any day he is not 
current. 
4. No violations of law. 
5. No consumption of alcohol or alcoholic beverages. 
6. No use or possession of controlled substances. 
7. Submit to search of person, premises or vehicles and 
seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request of 
a probation or police officer. 
8. Submit to body fluids testing upon request. 
9. No association with known drug users. 
10. No association with co-defendants. 
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11.. Drug and/or alcohol evaluation and follow-up. 
12. Maintain full time employment. 
13. No living with a person of the opposite sex without 
being married. 
14. Felony Drug Supervision Program. 
IT IS ORDERED that the Davis County Sheriff take the said 
defendant into his custody and confine and imprison said defendant 
in the Davis County Jail for the period of 30 days. 
DATED this / day of ^ 7>/^«, , 1992. 
fE BY T7HE COURT: /-
/ / 
JUDGTE--^ 
\ .s~\,.sL y—&<=^s^ 
Mailed an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment this 
&Ky^* day of May, 1992 to Robert Neeley, Attorney for Defendant, at 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200/ Ogden, Utah 84401. 
fy-tf/jftChAj'A 
